Excellent!

So what you’re saying is that fixed term parliaments take away the power of the Prime Minister to fuck parliament whenever he wants and call an election to suit his own political agenda, not to mention removing all the lame arse speculation that goes with when he/she will call it?

And that this 55% rule is necessary to ensure the PM can’t fuck around with it?

And that people on “the progressive left” are opposed to it, when the “only progressive party” introduced such a rule for the Scottish Parliament in 1998?

Elementary!

Very good. Not exactly rocket science, eh?

I find it hilarious that “Sheryl Odium” has re-tweeted this link with the hashtag #noto55. Did she even bother to read the post at all? #takeitback – take what back, and for whom? Take parliament back for Labour? No thanks luv!

The hashtag really should be #notofixedtermparliaments or #yestooverpowerfulunelectedprimeministers

But of course! It all makes sense now.

Blanco, a lot of us have been using the #noto55 hashtag to try and spread some sense across Twitter. Unfortunately people really have it in their minds a) that somehoe democracy is at a loss from fixed terms, b) that this is some kind of not so clandestine dictatorship grab, c) that it means governments can never be voted out or d) that it’s actually all fine but they’re Labour supporters so they’re stirring the shit anyway.

Twitter is brilliant for fast action and mobilisation, especially on digital issues, but only when the premise that it’s based on is a truth. This episode has shown just how bad it can go when people completely misunderstand or are misled on a subject.

We’re now faced with a portion of the public, not helped by the media that to this very day are still misreporting the situation, that believe a coalition is trying to remove itself from democratic practices which couldn’t be further from reality. This is going to be a stressful parliament for those like myself.

@Lee, doesnt using the same hashtag cloud matters somewhat? a lot of the kneejerk fools who do everything twitter trends tell them to do, might see it trending and get the simplistic thought into their head along the lines of “ah, i’ve heard about this 55% rule. typical Lib Dem betrayal. knew i should’ve voted Labour. well, my beloved party of the left isn’t in government so i have to somehow rediscover my appetite for fighting the government”

It’s amazing. Fixed term parliaments have been a stable of constitutional reformers for decades. We’ve got them. That is a big fat fucking win.

Blanco, a lot of us have been using the #noto55 hashtag to try and spread some sense across Twitter.

Wouldn’t it perhaps have been a good idea to try spreading that argument _before_ adopting it as policy in a situation where it really looks like a naked attempt to cling to a scrap of power?

Maybe it’s so strongly inherently right that people would have been persuaded. Maybe they’d have pointed out a flaw that make you think again.

Thing is, if, for whatever reason, people wouldn’t go for it under those circumstances, then they certainly won’t now.

why not 4 years?

Blanco, it’s not trending, so that doesn’t really matter.

Plus I’m actually against 55% anyway, it’s too low.

“Wouldn’t it perhaps have been a good idea to try spreading that argument _before_ adopting it as policy in a situation where it really looks like a naked attempt to cling to a scrap of power?”

I don’t think anyone thought for a second that the supporters of a party that was going to roughly try to implement the same policy was going to ditch their principles to make a pathetic partisan attack.

“why not 4 years?”

Excellent question and one we should be asking our MPs to ask when it’s put to parliament.

You lost, that means you don’t get to make the rules anymore.

Over it get.

“I don’t think anyone thought for a second that the supporters of a party that was going to roughly try to implement the same policy was going to ditch their principles to make a pathetic partisan attack.”

This is Labour. How many years did they spend in opposition denouncing Tory policies, before implementing them when they got into power?

As to 4/5 years – I would have preferred 4 years, but I think it’s bad for democracy if the local and general elections are on the same day, which is what putting it at 4 years would’ve ensured.

My take on some other problems with this, drawing on the experience of having a quasi-constitution already.
http://www.twodoctors.org/2010/05/55-a-quick-constitutional.html

You lost, that means you don’t get to make the rules anymore.

Over it get.
That has the sound of an elective dictatorship.
Hypocrite.
Chavamatt

“You lost, that means you don’t get to make the rules anymore.”

Everyone lost troll.

Blanco, more worrying is that the devolved parliament/assemblies have an election (for fixed terms) on the 7 May 2015. They do not want a general election on that day too, and guess what? they were there first. So CameronClegg will have to change their announcement to a 4 year term instead. Expect it to be announced next week without any humility from CameronClegg (since he does not have any).

Yet another case of CameronClegg not thinking things through first.

I don’t see how it’s contrary to democracy to hold local and general elections on the same day – if anything it means turnout is likely to be higher in local elections, which is good for democracy.

This whole debacle has confirmed to me that I’m definitely against fixed term parliaments (having previously been ambivalent), and everything that’s happened since May 6th has made me even more against PR. However I think pretty much everyone has admitted that the 55% figure has been invented purely for the purpose of this parliament, which is surely not a good basis to make policy on.

Amusing take.
As a general exposition, this works and is brilliant. In this particular context, it does not.

Yes, if fixed term parliaments are to be meaningful, there must be a super-majority threshold.

It is the case that Labour (who lost) had a general statement about fixed term parliaments in its manifesto (up front and in the introdution). The Liberal Democrats also had it in their manifesto, but it was not even deemed important enough to be mentioned in its summary section on political reform -just a one liner. The Tory manifesto did not. All that was offered in Labour and LD mainfestos was a general statement.

As someone committed to political reform, I expect there to be a democratic mandate for constitutional change. We just had the best opportunity for this debate to occur. It did not. I have – here, there and everywhere – asked people for any examples of leaflets, debate and/or discussion on this issue in the campaign. I am still waiting (I know about the Guardian article). Soru at 7 makes this point clearly.

You cannot even legitimately argue that it was at the forefront of campaign reform groups’ agendas/discussion (except for the inactive and soley LD (okay – one Tory) Campaign for a Fixed Parliament. Look at their websites.

The fact that it is part of the ‘constitution’ of Scotland (and the trend internationally) cannot supply a legitimacy for its appearance here and now as a proposal for the UK Parliament. We did not have this debate for the UK parliament . I think James’ link at 12 offers some clarity about the differences between Scotland and the UK.

The classical liberal rationale for it is precisely as you put it: that it strengthens parliament against the PM and/or the opposition against the whims of a PM. There are other arguments as well, particularly related to PR.

This has not been the justification for this given by either the LibDem spokesmen on Newsnight (see Next Left) or by Cameron. From the former: “It prevents a surprise attack on the Conservatives by everybody else: it is as simple as that”, as LibDem negotiator Andrew Stunnell told Newsnight. From Cameron today: it is to ensure ‘a strong and stable government.’

It was a political fix to achieve a coalition. IMO you do not ‘change the constitution’ to address a very specific political circumstance or problem; well not if you are serious.
It is also obviously a temporary ‘constitutional change’ in any case, because it cannot bind another parliament.

There is a lot more to say about some of the issues and scenarios that I think this would throw up in practice later, but I won’t go on, because I am getting boring.

As you say, the real question is about a fixed term Parliament. As I said in my very first post about fixed term parliaments three days ago, I am very open to debate about this.

I will continue to oppose this because I believe that a democratic mandate is needed for constitutional change; that does not necessarily require a referendum. This is not a super change, but it is quite major. They had the chance to get that mandate and they did not get it. The justifications now being offered are at the best inadequate and at worst repellent.

I think the shoddy way this was introduced and is now being justified sets back political reform. Soru at 7 puts this well.

(And yes to all those shouting tribalist, I would not have supported a Labour government introducing something similar or AV through legislation rather than a referendum as part of a coalition deal with the LibDems – despite my strong support for electoral reform and the fact that AV has been very widely discussed).

But we have the argument from the LibDem negotiators of why 55% was chosen: very difficult to back Fixed Dates at 55% … there is also a clear implication that we won’t have a Scottish-style rule on clock ticking to dissolution, given what they say about rationalie for it
http//www.nextleft.org/2010/05/libdems-destroy-defence-of-55-rule.html

Does anybody disagree with the idea that the no confidence rules and conventions (and how they would work with this change) should be codified in a non-partisan way, before Parliament votes on this. That was done for hung Parliaments, and it was important that it was. Of course, can debate changes to the rules and conventions, but important to have agreement on how they will be followed
http://www.nextleft.org/2010/05/questions-of-confidence-for-coalition.html

@Elaine

Ending child immigrant detention wasn’t anywhere in the campaign. I suppose the government has no mandate to carry through that either.

Labour – 2nd worse defeat since 1931 and they’re acting like they’re in government, telling everyone else what will and what won’t work.

Elaine: So for you, there’s no point implementing anything this government apart from what was debated on the TV debates really…given that it’s the only set of things anyone really made a fuss about? Screw the rest of the manifesto, because it’s not described in precisely the way you want it they can’t even attempt to take it through parliament and implement it?

Give me a break.

Sunder: yes, if we’re going to reform it needs to be done properly. I can see why they’re keen specifically to get this 55% in now, and in all honesty it may be sensible as long as it is a very short term measure.

People seem to forget we’ve got a parliament with no overall majority for any one party…we have more say as a public than we ever had. When they bring out the policy, if it doesn’t say anything about timeouts or sunset clauses or similar then we need to do our part and push for it. To assume, however, that government would put forward policy that would willingly let parliament devolve in to chaos and the country in to instability, is an assumption too far at this stage.

“This has not been the justification for this given by either the LibDem spokesmen on Newsnight (see Next Left) or by Cameron”

Actually, Cameron did. he was speaking at the Business Dep. and talked about Brown’s dithering in 2007.

Blanco and Lee

I specifically and only said consititutional change. I am sorry if I did not make that crystal clear — as I had in my other posts.

This is an important constitutional change. This is a change that affects this parliament. This parliament was elected under a ‘constitution’ that did not have a fixed term and did not require 55% for dissolution.

It can be argued that it has been introduced to address a specific party-political problem: a lack of ‘trust’ between members of a coalition; this is shaped/reinforced by the constitutional context. Constitutional change of this type should not be used to address a specific, unique party political problem. There should be another mechanism used.

There have been minority governments before; there have been coalition governments before. I recognise that public expectations and the context for political reform have changed and that, as Lee says, we have more ways to make our views heard by MPs.

Sunder: Much to unpack there. I agree that any of this has to be done seriously and systematically in a manifestly non-partisan way.

Why is it, Elaine, that I think had Labour done the same thing so many of its twitterers/twats etc wouldn’t be so up in arms? Where was the outrage in 1998, with the Scotland Act?

In the real world, these votes, whether of confidence or for dissolution, will be taken against a background of opinion polls.

If the polls show Labour comfortably ahead, neither type of vote will take place, unless (which is unlikely) they also show that the LDs will gain support by switching to backing Labour. As in the run-up to the 1992 and 2010 elections, the government will stumble on to full term, hoping something will turn up.

If the polls show the coalition ahead, then it has the option to call an opportunistic election but probably wouldn’t. It’s kinda boxed in.

The real fun starts if the polls show that the Tories don’t need the LibDems anymore. (You may think this unlikely, but if LD support collapses to below 10% as it might…) A restless 1922 Committee has brought down a coalition government before now.

@24. blanco

Can you grasp that some of the – ahem – hysteria isn’t about the idea of a supermajority vote for dissolution isn’t about its existence as much as it’s about the way it’s being cobbled together for just this parliament? That no-one, not even fictional characters, is really clear exactly what this means in practice?* I think people get that you think that the example of Scotland is the end of the story despite all the, y’know, differences and despite all the questions raised. So you don’t have to keep repeating it.

@22 Alex Actually, Cameron did. he was speaking at the Business Dep. and talked about Brown’s dithering in 2007.

Did he also mention how he’ll keep his pledge to ensure ‘unelected’ prime ministers have to face an election in six months?

*Could a bare majority repeal it? Wouldn’t that be a bit weird?

The reason I asked “why not 4 years” is that a 5 year term will mean UK, Scottish and (English) local elections all on the same day…..

The UK elections will (possibly) be AV, the local elections FPTP and the Scottish elections will use Mixed Member/list system.

When the Scottish Parliament and Scottish local elections were held on the same day in 2007, it was utter chaos…

Somebody not thinking through their strategy properly.

And yes, I agree with everyone else, the magicking up of a 55% threshold looks might suspicious….

I predict changes to te timetable and to the threshold.

Excellent article, and so very true. The sophistry of those frothing against this is breathtaking. Falkoner particularly.

“the magicking up of a 55% threshold looks might suspicious….”

So you;ve not actually looked into the issue then, it just smells “suspicious”? Bravo

The problem with the Purple, Black, Brown scenario is that if you think about it, no theshold, whether 55% or 66%, plays any role in it. The only change that’s needed in order to allow Brown and Black to take over is to take away from the PM the unilateral right to ask for a dissolution. The scenario doesn’t make the case for enhanced majorities at all.

And, by the way, any combination of two parties in the scenario has, combined, more than 55%. Either coalition, whether Purple/Black or Brown/Black, could have got a dissolution at any time so long as they held together. The only reason they don’t is that they don’t want one.

Finally, I not that Holmes says of 55%:

“this is cynical opportunism. The figure is just beneath the percentage of the coalition parties and would allow them to force an election contrary to the spirit of the fixed term rules”.

He’s quite right.

I might be totally misunderstanding this issue but does it not institutionalise the concept of ‘ unelected Prime Minister ‘ ? In the context of the last couple of years of hysteria about unelected it seems a strange move to institutionalise the concept. If a Prime Minister dies in post or is removed as party leader, the new leader is um ‘ unelected ‘. Constitutional changes which bind your successors are as profoundly undemocratic as written constitutions. What right does a 2010 legislator have to tell a 2050 one how they should act?

What is so great and democratic about fixed-term parliaments?

If the dissolution of parliament requires 55%, is it not the case only 50%+1 would be required to abolish the 55% rule?

Yeah, the 55% figure actually stops the Tories abusing their position in a coalition – and that’s a bad thing according to Labourites?

I think it’s obvious that any move, even positive one such as ending child immigrant detention or giving us fixed term parliaments, will be criticised purely on the grounds that it’s THEM doing it, and not US.

Can anyone who thought that the Lib Dems should’ve done C&S tell me: why do you think it’s good that we lock up the children of immigrants? Why do you want to keep ID cards? Do you like the database state? Do you think that civil liberties are just luxuries for middle class sandle-wearers?

“What is so great and democratic about fixed-term parliaments?”

Oh my daze, is your partisanship so far gone that you will ignore the fact this was also in your manifesto? And that people have been campaigning for it for decades?

Fixed term parliaments remove the massive power our system confers upon the PM to dissolve parliament whenever he wants, at a time that suits his political interests.

It’s

that

simple.

33. blanco

“What is so great and democratic about fixed-term parliaments?”

Oh my daze, is your partisanship so far gone that you will ignore the fact this was also in your manifesto? And that people have been campaigning for it for decades?

Fixed term parliaments remove the massive power our system confers upon the PM to dissolve parliament whenever he wants, at a time that suits his political interests.

It’s

that

simple.’

My manifesto? You are wrong in assuming I am partisan, Blanco. I have no particular affinity to any party and would never dream of joining one. Just a plain vanilla liberal.

If the present system confers upon the PM massive power. The new system does not abolish the power it only transfers it some other body. Can you not see anything bizarre in dissolution requiring 55%, but abolishing the rule only requires 50%+1?

Holmes dismissed me peremptorily. “That distinction between the confidence vote and the vote for dissolution is embodied within the british constitution already my dear Watson. In Scotland. In the Scotland Act 1998. Under those rules a first minister can be dismissed and appointed by a simple majority in the parliament (50% plus 1 of those who vote). If the first minister is dismissed then section 46 provides that a new first minister (and government) has to be appointed within 28 days. If there is not, then section 3 provides that a new election must take place.”

—————————————————–

This is not in the proposals for the House of Commons as it has been laid out at this stage, so it is somewhat premature to conclude it would be.

The difference between confidence and dissolution is being used to justify this proposal, as if you can simply divorce one from the other. Well in the nice safe world of political theory maybe you can, in terms of a constitutional settlement for a future parliament, maybe you can. In political practice in other parliaments, maybe you can.

The significant point is we are talking about a Parliament that has not been elected on this basis. No one party was given an overall majority, all the parties should serve in the current parliament under the basis it was elected; and deal with the realities of the electorates’ decision within that context. They should not be trying to ‘fix’ the constitutional arrangements of this parliament to get short term political gain disguised as either providing for stability and/or enhancing democracy.

By trying to separate confidence from dissolution and moving the goalposts to 55% for that, you are trying to insulate yourselves and enjoy the same protection from dissolution a majority Government has.

All sorts of scenarios could arise once confidence was lost, yes there could be a Lib-Lab Deal, there could be a minority Tory Government, there could just as easily be legislative inertia and a constitutional crisis. No Government can command a simple majority, yet there is not 55% in favour of dissolution. Just a complete mess.

This parliament was not elected on the basis of serving a fixed term. It should serve only upon the basis it was elected. The issue of a fixed term parliament and the arrangements for its dissolution should only apply to future parliaments.

This proposal is the complete opposite of democracy. It seeks to entrench the major party and the current coalition in power for five years, regardless of whether parliament has confidence in it.

We need to look at the reality of this parliament and not some nice theory about how a fixed term parliament should work.

The reality of this parliament is that no one party has an overall majority and that thanks to FPTP we have distorted levels of party representation. We have the situation where the major party has 36% support but wields 47% of the power and the third party has 24% support but wields only 9% of the power; in terms of votes. Labour has 29% support and 40% of the voting power. The only way that the 55% mark for dissolution can be reached is with some support from the major party.

I am in favour of fixed term parliaments oddly enough. But we need to be very cautious about throwing away centuries of our constitutional arrangements for short term political expediency, dressed up as stability.

If we have a fixed term parliament elected upon a proportional voting system then a threshold of 55% or higher would be democratic. The reality of our current parliament is very different. What might work for a theoretical parliament simply does not cut in under the present realities.

Any fixed Term Parliament elected under FPTP or for that matter AV must retain simple majority rules for dissolution, given the distorted levels of representation and voting power they create.

It was in Labour and the Lib Dems’ manifesto. Deal with it.

Not an expert on this, but for everyone saying it would only take a 50% + 1 majority to repeal, as I understand it this wouldn’t work as a quick way of dissolving parliament as it would need to go through both the Commons and the Lords which takes a while. There might be issues of timetabling the vote and debate which would make a difference as well, but I’m not particularly well informed on this stuff.

@Thomas

Hague said they were going to put down a binding motion for this parliament to last 5 years. I’m not sure there is such a thing as a ‘binding motion’ in our constitution. Happy to be corrected on this.

@ 13 “You lost, that means you don’t get to make the rules anymore.

Over it get.
That has the sound of an elective dictatorship.
Hypocrite.
Chavamatt”

Indeed it does but the very same thing was said to me on this blog. Tables turned. Up em it they do not like. Lefties have *always* been bad losers

Er, Parliaments already have a fixed maximum term, and no prime minister has yet managed to make an early election call that gave him/her an ‘advantage’.

Fixed terms have absolutely nothing to do with democracy, and everything to do with making politicians’ lives easier. It makes election preparation the priority of the opposition, rather than being the opposition.

It makes public pressure on a leader totally irrelevant, and if you can’t see how undemocratic that is, you’re an idiot.

Of all the constitutional reforms that have been bandied around, this is the only one that, if passed, would make me consider washing my hands of the UK entirely and heading for Europe.

‘I might be totally misunderstanding this issue but does it not institutionalise the concept of ‘ unelected Prime Minister ‘ ? ‘

Remind me – when was the last time we actually voted on a Prime Minister?

C’mon. Surely I’m not the only one thinking that compared with other presently pressing policy issues – such as curbing the fiscal deficit and where the spending cuts will fall or regulatory reform of financial markets and institutions, like hedge funds – the 55% issue is pretty trivial stuff even if Labour pols appear so het up about it?

The fact that they are so apparently het up about it, despite a declared preference for fixed term Parliaments, suggests the Labour Party is now politically bankrupt.

Have fun Gwyn – they have fixed term legislatures there too

[40] I have heard a fair few reasons over the years advanced as to why the USA isn’t a democracy, but the fixed Presidential term is a new one on me.

Its funny, I get the impression that more tories post on this site than people of other persuasions.

‘The fact that they are so apparently het up about it, despite a declared preference for fixed term Parliaments, suggests the Labour Party is now politically bankrupt.’

I think Labour are forgeting they are only suposed to renege on promises when they are *in* power.

I guess the habit is hard to break.

Gwyn – it was in Labour’s manifesto!

41. Shatterface

‘I might be totally misunderstanding this issue but does it not institutionalise the concept of ‘ unelected Prime Minister ‘ ? ‘

‘ Remind me – when was the last time we actually voted on a Prime Minister? ‘

We don’t vote for a Prime Minister, Shatterface. However, the whole print media, other political parties and even the BBC have consistently used this argument against Brown for two years. If the concept exists it will now be institutionalised and the subject of accusations of being ‘ unelected ‘ can do nothing about it.

“Holmes ended, ‘If people are against fixed term parliaments – let that lie at the centre of their argument… the 55% rule (or some higher variant of it) is an inevitable consequence of fixed term parliaments. Let people argue about the real point of principle – the fixed term parliament… rather than focusing on a red herring.”

What makes anyone think that those repelled by the 55% rule are against fixed terms, when the proposal is itself contrary to fixed terms? And why should those of us who prefer regular elections remain silent about a provision that Mr Holmes himself considers an act of “cynical opportunism”?

Permitting a majority – whether 55%, 67% or any other figure – to vote dissolution is not an “inevitable consequence” of fixed terms. Nor is it desirable. Premature elections should surely be a last resort in the event of chronic parliamentary deadlock that prevents the governance of the country, rather then the privilege of a government with a healthy majority. And it’s in such a stalemate that a majority for dissolution is least likely to be found.

Let dissolution occur only after the Opposition (and perhaps others) have had a chance to form a government and it is clear that no viable majority can be assembled. That means taking the choice from MPs, and specifying the circumstances (as in Scotland’s 28-day clause) under which the regular electoral cycle can be interrupted (and only interrupted, with an “unscheduled” Parliament to serve only whatever remains of the full term of its last regularly-elected predecessor, and the next election to follow as originally scheduled regardless of intervening polls).

This is no red herring: as the proposal stands (and it’s indeed shocking that ministers have yet to clarify a fundamental and dangerous alteration of the rules under which this Parliament was elected), it threatens to paralyse future government while uniquely privileging one likely combination in the present Commons. It’s a bad scheme, and it should be dropped in favour of regular elections with provision for intervening polls only when absolutely necessary rather than as a needless luxury for a government seeking only to extend its life.

The original of this post was at http://loveandgarbage.livejournal.com/325531.html and there have been some excellent comments from Carl Gardner and Dave Parker – largely repeated above – there.

I should explain that I am a lawyer working in Scotland and was a little taken aback by some of the views expressed in relation to the concept of an enhanced majority and fixed term parliaments. The blog post was partly inspired by the confusion around the distinction between a confidence and dissolution vote (apparent in the comments of more than one Scottish Labour MP). It was partly intended to demonstrate that the two were distinct and to show how that worked.

I personally am equivocal on fixed term parliaments – they work well in Scotland (the rules on special elections outwith the fixed term operate from ss 3 and 46 of the Scotland Act 1998) but I can see advantages and disadvantages, but would really like that issue properly debated. But if we are to have fixed term parliaments I believe that there are certain necessary things that follow it.

First, allowing dissolution based automatically on a vote in the Commons of 50% plus one while notionally shifting the power to Parliament from a Prime Minister effectively retains the power of the PM because a whipped vote by the government (which will ordinarily have a majority of votes) can circumvent the rule and force an election at a time of maximum convenience to the governing party. This suggests to me that there should be an enhanced majority for dissolution. Here, I think the coalition agreement is cynical and agree with criticisms of the 55% rule. In the context of the present House of Commons only 2 parties together cross that threshold – conveniently the governing coalition. If a 50% plus one rule runs counter to the principle of fixed term parliaments and the removal of the power from PM to parliament, a 55% rule does too in this context – and ironically creates the situation where a government with a landslide has more power to manipulate elections to electoral advantages. To that end I would favour a higher threshold for dissolution votes. At least 2/3 or – given the first past the post system – higher.

Second, fixed term parliaments carry with them – I think – an implication that a government can be changed mid-term without an election (as in the example in the post); and therefore imply a separation of dissolution and confidence. some will be uncomfortable with this. The media coverage about the “unelected PM” suggests many would find this problematic (although I personally find it odd in a parliamentary democracy, and given the relative frequency of unelected PMs in Uk politics (Brown, Major, Callaghan, Home, Eden, Churchill – were all initially “unelected PMs”) in the past 70 years).

However, if we accept that a confidence vote can force a change of government what if no new government can win the confidence of the house? In Scotland this is dealt with by the 28 day period to allow election of a new First Minister. I think that is a good thing. But 28 days seems too long. I would favour 10 or 14 days (particularly if a fairly sophisticated coalition agreement can be negotiated within 7 days immediately after a general election).

Sadly we do not have the detail at the moment but if we are to have fixed term parliaments I would hope that a higher threshold for dissolution, and a relatively short time limit to form a new government in the event of a lost confidence vote would apply.

With those proposals I wonder if the critics and the proponents of the rule would be that far apart?

Re: blanco

Case in point, really. I’ve got no emotional investment in european politics. If fixed terms came into force in the UK I could just go there and forget all about the shitshow that passes for politics here.

I don’t care whose manifesto it was in either. The only foreseeable outcome would be to introduce the sort of complacency and feeble-mindedness that characterises mainstream american politics, where people lie down for three years, watch adverts for one year, spend twenty minutes voting then lie back down.

re: 50. loveandgarbage, 4.41 pm
“Sadly we do not have the detail at the moment but if we are to have fixed term parliaments I would hope that a higher threshold for dissolution, and a relatively short time limit to form a new government in the event of a lost confidence vote would apply. With those proposals I wonder if the critics and the proponents of the rule would be that far apart?”

Indeed, that would remove my principal objection provided there were sufficient safeguards to allow opposition parties a chance to replace a defeated government prior to dissolution: it’s all the more frustrating that no official clarification has been issued to address at least the question of parliamentary deadlock, when it’s of such vital constitutional importance. Personally I’d remove the option of voluntary dissolution from government and Commons alike, but I can live with any figure that happens not just to coincide with the share available solely to the parties proposing the legislation!

You fail to recognise that the Scottish Parliament selects the first minister and that the first minister must secure the support of a simple majority of MSPs. If it fails to select a first minister within 28 days it is dissolved.

The UK prime minister is appointed by the monarch. The prime minister does not resign on a no confidence vote, but the government does. Callaghan did not resign on a no confidence vote, he asked the Queen to dissolve parliament.

Simon mentions the US, but not that they have an elected head of state in control of the executive.

Under this proposal, if the government lost a confidence vote, like the budget or Queen’s speech, Cameron would be obliged to remain as PM until the Queen was able to appoint someone who she felt was able to command the confidence of parliament. Cameron would get first go at forming a new government and would be free to have a go at governing alone.

There is a significant risk that the monarch would be politicised. Taking away the PM’s ability to call elections to suit himself is a good thing, but politicising the monarchy is worse.

Fixed term parliaments have their merits, but are difficult to implement democratically without making other significant constitutional reforms. It may be that an elected head of state needs to come first.

re: 53. Stephen Newton
“Under this proposal, if the government lost a confidence vote, like the budget or Queen’s speech, Cameron would be obliged to remain as PM until the Queen was able to appoint someone who she felt was able to command the confidence of parliament.”
That’s pretty much how things stand at present, though by convention rather than in law. The change under this proposal is that the Commons could vote its own dissolution, denying the Queen the reserve power to keep MPs at their post. It actually makes an unnecessary early election easier for a government with a healthy majority and harder in the event of parliamentary stalemate when it’s most needed.

“Cameron would get first go at forming a new government and would be free to have a go at governing alone.”
He’d rightly get first go at forming a new government unless his advice to the monarch was to invite someone else. But I can’t see the Queen entrusting the task of governing alone (other than in a merely caretaker capacity) to the leader of a party that couldn’t survive a confidence vote even in coalition. If she thinks someone else can govern without a dissolution, she has the reserve power to deny the outgoing PM either a new commission or a dissolution, and to invite another leader instead. I’d like to see the procedure strictly codified and all major parties (including a defeated PM’s own) guaranteed an opportunity to form a viable successor Administration, rather than legislation to allow a powerful government a dissolution at will.

“There is a significant risk that the monarch would be politicised. Taking away the PM’s ability to call elections to suit himself is a good thing, but politicising the monarchy is worse.”
There’s already a significant risk of the monarch being politicised, precisely because of the vagueness of the reserve powers on which the proposed 55% rule could make us still more reliant. The problem here is that the proposal doesn’t take away a PM’s right to call an election to suit himself if he can command 55% of the Commons: instead, it entrenches that right while preventing dissolution of a Parliament that can n longer function.

“Fixed term parliaments have their merits, but are difficult to implement democratically without making other significant constitutional reforms. It may be that an elected head of state needs to come first.”
An elected head of state would face just the same quandaries. I think agreed clarification of the head of state’s powers and responsibilities should come first. If she or he has a clear agreed manual to follow, there’ll be less risk of politicisation. MP’s will have less cause for complaint when the procedure’s what they voted for.

@50

The media coverage about the “unelected PM” suggests many would find this problematic (although I personally find it odd in a parliamentary democracy, and given the relative frequency of unelected PMs in Uk politics (Brown, Major, Callaghan, Home, Eden, Churchill – were all initially “unelected PMs”) in the past 70 years).

Argh. I’m fed up with this “unelected PM” meme: no PM has ever been “elected” by the whole nation. We don’t do it. Never have done. We vote for an MP and an MP only.
I’d love there to be an elected head of state but right now there isn’t, so let’s nip this misinformation in the bud please.

[55] It was started by the Tories as a stick to beat Brown with, and was useful to them particularly to cover up the fact that they had no alternative policy to “Quantative Easing”. Serve them right if it comes back to bite them.

Stephen Newton,

Could you explain to me how the Queen becomes politicised? I don’t really see that at the moment….

Before this ‘disappears’ below the front page, can I ask Sunny to ensure that Liberal Conspiracy revisits this topic when more details of the ‘agreement’ come out.

After the debates here and elsewhere, I am more convinced than ever that this Con/LD version of fixed term agreement is not a political reform, rather it is a political fix.

Here are my favourite highlights from this thread and discussions on Next Left.

Sunder Katwala’s post on the agreement with his quotes and links to the Newsnight interviews with the LD negotiators makes it evident that this was a party political deal, not some high-minded implementation of principle.
Carl at 30: nails why this amusing post doesn’t work for the numbers in this specific context.
Steve D 35: who is actually in favour of fixed term parliaments, with great clarity makes points similar to mine, including “This parliament was not elected on the basis of serving a fixed term. It should serve only upon the basis it was elected. . They should not be trying to ‘fix’ the constitutional arrangements of this parliament to get short term political gain disguised as either providing for stability and/or enhancing democracy.”
Both Thomas at 37 and Dave Parker at 54 posts raise crucial questions. How easy would it be to impede or undo this constitutional change? Is it – in effect – a very illiberal change?
Mr S Pill 55 emphatically agree with your point about elected PM, but it would be ironic if Cameron’s (don’t think Clegg used this) stick can be used to beat him/Tories.
Posts 50, 52 and 53 also raise points that I would hope we could return to when details are published.
Finally, Sunder Katwala makes some constructive suggestions about thishere