Yes, an important point, and one that might rather invalidate an otherwise worthwhile exercise – is there a ‘gold standard’ or is the plain fact nobody can really be sure of the true numbers?

Given that immigration has become the battleground for intense cultural conflict who do we trust to capture the data in a non-partizan way?

This post was mentioned on Twitter by AylesburySting: RT @libcon: :: The Truth about Immigration: Introduction/Key Concepts http://bit.ly/7veqHt...

The net migration figures are based on the International Passenger Survey, in which a very small number of airline passengers are questioned as to their movements. The survey results are then ‘massaged’ by the ONS to form the officially-cited figures for net migration.

The Control of Immigration Statistics report which is updated by the Home Office each quarter counts in every non-EEA arrival given ‘leave to enter’, but notoriously does not count them back out again.

All we know for sure is that in 2008 12.7 million such arrivals were admitted.
Of those 12.7 million, around 675,000 technically fall within the UN definition of migrant. How many of the rest simply disappear after arrival, nobody has the slightest idea, nor is there any reliable data about the numbers admitted through the myriad migrant channels simply stay on after their official stay expires.

You need to be honest and straightforward about the statistical reliability of the claims that you will be making.

Only if you fail to make the distinction between migration and settlement, the latter of which I’ll tackle later in the series.

For all this to make sense, there’s a need to establish that population demographics are dynamic, not static. Once that’s sorted, then I can out settlement and citizenship patterns into their proper context.

One thing I’m trying to put over is that different types of migration have very different impacts and demand very different policy responses.

Echoing the initial commenter above, that’s unfortunate because the debate has shifted away from simple economics and having ‘fun with numbers’ to the deeper, societal concerns associated with the demographics transformation now underway in the UK. Even ‘moderate’ restrictionists like Bob Rowthorn who concede the that mass migration may be no worse than ecnomically neutral take the stance they have because of the socio-cultural effects.

[i]… ‘that’s an interesting point – why don’t you go and write something about it yourself and link back to here?’[/i]

I have, but immigration promoters will probably find it far outside theirr comfort zone.

http://majorityrights.com/index.php/weblog/comments/the_immigration_industry_tacks_into_the_wind/

[i]First, much of the data we’ll be working with relates to [b]net migration[/b], which takes into account the fact that migration is a two-way street[/i]

This is true. However a focus on net migration numbers is unhelpful, since it fails to take proper account of the constituent components of the two-way migrant stream in terms of ethnicity, and does not properly identify permanent settlers.

[i]Second, it needs to be understood, when looking at population demographics, that [b]migration is not the same as settlement.[/b][/i]

This is also true. The settlement statistics are far more revealing than the net migration figures. They demonstrate very clearly the demographic transformation that is underway: native Britons are leaving and their places are being taken by migrants from the third world.

Article four covers economic migration properly, but without giving too much away, net migration from the EU after accession (2004-2007) totalled 404,000 for the whole of the enlarged EU, not ‘millions’ and you’ll find some of the other evidence really – and I do mean really – surprising.

Although, the idea that the influx of millions of EU workers since EU expansionism in 2004 has resulted in an increase in employment opportunities today is quite demonstrably false.

There is scope for others to fill in the gaps in the main series, not to mention a likelihood of further articles in the future, especially as we get closer to the election.

For now, the need is to bottom out the main demographic evidence before moving on to some of the qualitative consequences of immigration.

As such, important topics such as crime, social cohesion, multiculturalism and the tensions that exist at the intersection of different cultures brought into close proximity by immigration are likely to arise only tangentially.

That’s a shame, with respect, as I think these are just as important as the numbers.