So the claim that anonymous witness orders are necessary to persuade members of the public to come forward is exposed as a “shading” of the truth. In most cases, it’s to persuade police officers to do their job. (Yes, I know that being a policeman dealing with gang crime is a dangerous life – so don’t do it if unless you are prepared to give evidence at the end of it).

I’m considered, like Paul Luton, that the law as it stands following the ruling swings the balance too much in favour of the defendant. Some kind of modification is needed, and it looks like that’s what Straw is trying to do.

In fact, I was incomplete/wrong – or, rather, not up to date.

Evidence of prior convictions (plural) for the same offence (not just similar fact) is now (subject of course to the Court giving leave) admissible from the start, and the test is merely propensity – only if there is simply a single previous conviction will the Court need to look at whether the facts are similar. Attack the prosecution’s credit, however, and it all goes in, whatever the previous offence.

Ah yes, Volokh’s essay – haven’t seen it for a while but it is very good.

Robin:

Thanks – I knew there was something more than direct material relevance that could get priors in.

IIRC, prior convictions can be referenced in court in cross examination if directly relevant to the case at hand.

Information about a prior conviction is admissible if it can be shown to have a material connection to the case before the court.

So, for example, in a defendant is up on a stranger rape charge the prosecution couldn’t just lob in a prior for a date rape and invite the jury to infer that because the defendant has a prior conviction for rape they must be guilty as charged. If the prior were for another stranger rape and information from the prior case/conviction would establish a particular modus operandi or signature that would show that the two cases are connected to the same individual, then it may be possible to introduce that information because its relevant to the case at hand as long its not just generally prejudicial.

Defendant’s convictions are kept out because it is generally accepted that the jury will often believe that propensity is probative of guilt. If, however, the defendant puts credit in issue – if he says “believe me, because the prosecution witnesses are lying” – his record does go in.

On a more general point – the fact that the defence can never keep its witnesses anonymous from the prosecution means that witness intimidation by Crown witnesses remains unimpeded by this legislation; and anyone who thinks that in the precise circumstances where defence intimidation is a major issue – gang disputes – prosecution intimidation (by gang witnesses and their associates) wouldn’t take place is living in cloud-cuckoo land.

(First-timer here – found you googling for this issue)

Ridiculous, what’s the point of creating legislation which is undoubtably illegal?

Expediency. Makes them look like they’re doing something. A few court battles and years later the courts will make a “declaration of incompatibility.” Then the politicians can blame judges again.

Unity

And I’m not sure that article 6 can be derogated other than in a national emergency.

Quite right. Article 15 ECHR:

In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.

But of course they don’t need to derogate.

You may also be interested in nguitly men.

Because its not ‘we’ – a jury – making that judgment – it will be for a judge sitting alone to decide that under conditions in which the defence cannot subject the credibility of the witness to cross-examination.

You’re right that, generally, the introduction of information on prior convictions is not allowed in relation to the defendant but when it comes to witnesses the defence can draw that information out in cross -examination if its relevant to their credibility, in order that the jury can fairly make its assessment of whether or not to accept the witnesses testimony in view of the relevant facts, subject only to the judge’s view of the admissibility of such evidence.

That simply cannot happen under the provisions of this bill and its that that’s prejudicial in the extreme.

Paul:

The defendent is still presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and that is the touchstone of justice in a free and democratic society.

It may not play well on the front page of the Daily Mail, but I and many others, including the vast majority of the legal profession, I strongly suspect, still very much accept and adhere to Blackstone’s formulation that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer”.

If you look closely enough, you’ll find that principle expressed in the Bible (Genesis 18, 23-32) in which Abraham entreats Jehovah to spare the City of Sodom if but ten righteous men can be found living in it.

It was also used and expanded on by the great medieval Jewish philosopher, Mamonides, who argued that “”it is better and more satisfactory to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single innocent one to death.”

You’ll find a variation in Fortescue’s De Laudibus Legum Angliae (c. 1470) in which the ratio given is the acquittal of twenty guilty to one innocent and the same 10 to 1 ratio cited by Blackstone was also cited by Increase Mather during the Salem witch trials of 1692, while Benjamin Franklin thought 100 to 1 to be a more fitting expression of the principle.

By way of contrast Bismark is supposed to have framed it in opposite terms as “it is better that ten innocent men suffer than one guilty man escape;” and Pol Pot is claimed to have expressed a similar sentiment.

So, on one side we have the Bible, Mamonides, Fortescue, Mather, Franklin and Blackstone and on the other, perhaps apocryphally, Bismark and Pol Pot.

I don’t know about anyone else but, unlike the government, that ain’t a tough call from where I’m sitting – I’ll take Blackstone et al.

Quinn – our trust in what people say depends to some extent on who they are. An anonymous witness with a criminal record for perjury might lack credibility.

If the case being prosecuted is so tenuous that it hangs on verbal evidence we should ask why it is being brought in the first place.

Surely more emphasis should be placed on detection and prevention than on unfairly stitching up the rules of hearing because politicians are putting pressure on others to do their job for them and wasting everybody’s time in the process.

It’s typical of a Labour government to sit there and come up with truly bizarre legislation to cover for the fact they simply do not want to fund and resource our police forces appropriately, at least this is my view.

Exactly, a more suitable compromise would be to allow the defense team to know the identity of the witness but not the defendant him/herself. This could be implemented by holding members of a defendants legal team in contempt of court and removing their license to practice law if the revealed the witnesses identity to their client.

However, if the ECHR provides the right of a defendant to represent him/her-self in court (like the US does), then such a compromise would still be deemed illegal. Additionally, it would still restrict the defense because if a witness held a grudge against the defendant or had had a past relationship with the defendant, it may be the case that only the defendant him/her-self would have knowledge of this. After all, the defense team can not know all the past and present acquaintances of their client.

Unfortunately, there is no easy answer. It would appear that for the moment, the best option would be to shore up investment in witness protection schemes. However, how many witnesses would be prepared to make the huge sacrifice of having to go into witness protection to put someone behind bars?

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;

And I’m not sure that article 6 can be derogated other than in a national emergency.

Clearly, the conditions aren’t the same if the defence is required to disclose the identity of an anonymous witness to the prosecution but not vice versa.

What Straw is trying to do is draw a very narrow definition of ‘the same conditions’ that is explicitly limited to what can be visibly seen in the court room and which excludes any questions of information asymmetry between prosecution and defence.

Even if you approve of a bill that breaches the right to a fair trial, this will be shot down by the Law Lords and/or the European Court of Human Rights.