This is so true and is already happening. I have worked as a volunteer for a helpline and I know of examples of women who have kept experiences of domestic violence and rapes secret for fear of state intervention (for example, social services removing/taking away their children). I also know of teenagers with mental health problems and eating disorders who are refusing to seek help because they know that, should it go on file, it may be used against them in the future. Fran Lyon is a case in point and teenage girls are hearing the message: do not seek help for mental health problems if you wish to have children in the near future, as the child protection agencies will consider your past mental health problems as a “red flag”.

It is already well known that mothers suffering from PND do not admit to it, for fear of social services intervention. I also know of examples where staff have gossiped and passed on information to others although I admit I can not prove this, and herelies the problem. Yes, staff can be disciplined etc, but how many examples do you know of staff being disciplined for breaches of confidentiality? That’s because it is very difficult to prove breaches of confidentiality.

I admit that if someone really wants to obtain information on an individual, there are sufficient number of databases out there which already holds all the information that ContactPoint will hold. However, with ContactPoint, all this information will be readily available at a touch of a button to over 300,000+ civil servants. For example, although the details of a CAF will not be on ContactPoint, over 300,000+ civil servants will know that there is one available for perusal, and so long as you have a valid excuse, I mean reason, you can access it.

We will see how things pan out as I fear that this ContactPoint Database is here to stay. For all those who are “pro” Contact Point I leave you with this thought: I could be one of those 300,000+ civil servants who could access yours and your children’s details. Are you confident that the database is secure enough that only those civil servant who really need to know, will get access to your children’s’ details? Or will it end up being a free-for-all? After all, 300,000 civil servants – that’s a lot of people – a lot of confidentiality agreements – and a lot of people to monitor for possible breaches of confidentiality.

Thanks for replying. I can certainly see the genuine concern in respect of your comments about ex-partners and children.

But then in the govt dept I work for, almost all the staff have access to a centralised database with everyones personal details including NI numbers, DOB, address history, partners, children, etc. This has been around for decades. The problems you are describing of information being incorrectly given out to the wrong people could equally apply in this case.

I’ve never really sat down and thought through the rights and wrongs of our existing systems because I’ve always worked with it from when I started. The only thing I can comment on is its utility. The question for me is how different are the new systems from the existing ones?

I can only talk with any authority about children’s services, and in this area the direct research with children and young people keeps delivering exactly the same message: they will not use services unless they are sure that their confidentiality will be respected.

This potential deterrent created by data sharing is extremely serious. It means that the teenager with an STI or the child who is caring for a disabled parent won’t ask for the help they need. it means that the father suffering from depression or the mother with an alcohol problem won’t visit the doctor until crisis point is reached – which in turn increases the likelihood of child protection problems.

And then there are the dangers of information falling into the wrong hands, by which I don’t just mean the obvious. The lengths to which abusive ex-spouses will go to in order to locate their families are well-documented. And what about post-adoption identities, particularly in circumstances where natural parents really mustn’t find their child?

It’s a simple fact of information security that you cannot have a national database accessed by 300,000+ people (as with Contactpoint and, quite possibly, eCAF) and expect it to remain secure. The debacles of the last few weeks have demonstrated that people inevitably get careless. Security risks come from staff sharing log-ins, nipping to the loo and leaving files open, misdirecting files, sending unencrypted data through the post. Sometimes people are downright corrupt – data has a price.

As for the right to privacy, it’s fundamental to developing good personal boundaries. How do we bring children up to feel confident that they belong to themselves if their privacy can be violated by any number of people? How do we teach them to say ‘no’ to unwanted invasions of their personal space if they don’t in fact have personal privacy?

There’s a lot more I could say, too, but that’s probably enough to explain why I believe Contactpoint and eCAF to be profoundly misguided schemes. The best form of ‘early intervention’ in children’s problems comes from making sure that services are actually available, and offering them on terms that children and their families find acceptable.

The more Government departments collect data, the more likely it is there will be large-scale loss and (more worryingly still) large-scale misinterpretation. If you sat and thought about the monumental scale of the data routinely processed every day by the government machine then the routine mislaying milions of records wouldn’t seem quite so shocking. That people do find it shocking is vaguely reassuring in a way.

What bothers me most is the chasmic distance between the Government’s hopes for e-government and the way in which that manifests itself among the departments and contractors who actually do the work. Many departments are hamstrung by the historic silo mentality that ensures theory is ruined by the pointless duplication of practice. Many contractors view supposedly ground-breaking initiatives as merely another opportunity to sweat the same IT assets.

This Government, perhaps more than any other, devours data as a central part of its diet. What it spits out the other end is worse than reconstituted meat.

I work for one of the larger govt depts (though nothing to do with ContactPoint), and the attention given to the latest rash of e-govt reforms barely touch the surface of the amount of inter-departmental sharing and matching of data going on. Most people just don’t know what is going on, and almost no journalists or writers are showing any interest – or at least nothing beyond making bland statements about “big brother”. This statement has the convenience in getting people to agree with you, though not requiring you to actually have any detailed knowledge of the new plans (because most of your readers won’t either). Unfortunately crying ‘big brother’ is about as specific as they get. They may as well be shouting about “The Man”.

In my personal experience these reforms have certainly proved useful at improving efficiency – following in the steps of the private sector. It is safe so long as the people using it understand what they are dealing with, and how important protecting that information is. Of course, with recent scandals, we know that the precautions aren’t always in place.

I’d personally be very interested in an intelligent analysis of the clear material benefits the govt depts get from increasing e-govt (which in turn benefits us, the tax payer), weighed against the possible erosion of our human rights.